In a few decades of reconstruction, even the mathematical natural sciences, the ancient archetypes of theoretical perfection, have changed habit completely!
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In a few decades of reconstruction, even the mathematical natural sciences, the ancient archetypes of theoretical perfection, have changed habit completely!
However, as soon as any proposition about things Objective, any one at all, including even the most indubitable truth, claimed to be a valid truth, the soil of pure phenomenology is abandoned. For then we take tive soil and carry on psychology instead of phenomenology.
This is how positive knowledge makes progress. It takes possession, to an ever greater degree, of a reality that simply exists and is given as a matter of course by examining it more closely with respect to its extent, its content, its elements, relations, and laws.
It is to this world that our judgments refer. We make statements, sometimes singular, sometimes general, about things: their relations, their alterations, their functional dependencies and laws of transformation. Thus we find expression for what presents itself in direct experience. Following up on motives provided by experience itself, we infer from what is directly experienced in perception and memory to what is not experienced; we generalize; we apply in turn general knowledge to particular cases, or, in analytical thought, deduce new generalizations from general knowledge. Pieces of knowledge do not follow upon one another as a matter of mere succession. Rather, they enter into logical relations with each other, they follow from each other, they "agree" with each other, they confirm each other, thereby strengthening their logical power.
First, anyone who seriously intends to become a philosopher must "once in his life" withdraw into himself and attempt, within himself, to overthrow and build anew all the sciences that, up to then, he has been accepting.
Natural objects, for example, must be experienced before any theorizing about them can occur. Experiencing is consciousness that intuits something and values it to be actual; experiencing is intrinsically characterized as consciousness of the natural object in question and of it as the original: there is consciousness of the original as being there "in person."
Experience by itself is not science.
We want to busy ourselves with the basic problems of a general phenomenology of consciousness. We want to study the basic constitution of consciousness as such in its chief features.
Phenomenology is by no means psychology. It is found in a new dimension and demands an essentially different attitude from that of psychology as well as of any science of spatial–temporal existence.
The existence of what is given to immanent reflection is indubitable while what is experienced through external experience always allows the possibility that it may prove to be an illusory Object in the course of further experiences.